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On December 15. 1994. the state and federal govern-
ments, major water users, and environmental groups
announced an agreement (hereinafter "Bay/Delta Agree-
ment" or "Agreement) on the Bay/Delta environmental stan-
dards (hereinafter"Standards") that will govern the Bay/Delta
Estuary (hereinafter 'Estuary") over the next three years. The
Agreement is a major milestone in the history of California
water management, representing the first time that the major
interests involved in California water management-the state
and federal governments, the water users, and the environ-
mental community-have agreed to implement a specific list
of protective measures for the Estuary.
Much work remains. The Bay/Delta Agreement solves
neither the environmental problems in the Estuary, nor the
very real water supply problems now experienced by many
urban and agricultural agencies. Those problems will only
be solved by much more fundamental changes in
California's plumbing and water management practices. But
the Agreement is a good start Not only does the Agreement
provide significant environmental protections for the
Estuary; equally important, it demonstrates clearly that
when all sides work together in good faith, they can break
through the gridlock and create workable solutions to
California's water and environmental problems.
This Comment attempts to answer key questions about
the December 15 Agreement:
, What is in the Agreement? Is it biologically protective?
What are its strengths and weaknesses?
* What is the context of the Agreement? Why did it take
place when it did, the way it did?
" What happens now?
II. SNAPSHOT OF THE STANDARDS
The Standards generally build upon the D1485 stan-
dards set by the State Water Resources Control Board (here-
inafter "SWRCB") in 1978. Key elements are as follows:
" The Standards will be implemented immediately by the
federal government through the Endangered Species
Act (hereinafter "ESA7)
" The SWRCB will adopt the Standards in March 1995 and
will then begin a water rights process the determine
responsibility for meeting the standards.
" Until the SWRCB finalizes responsibility for the
Standards, the state and federal projects will have sole
responsibility for the Standards.
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* The Standards are designed to satisfy all flow
and diversion standards required by the federal
government under the Clean Water Act
(hereinafter "CWA") and the ESA. However, take
limits will remain for listed species (winter run
salmon and Delta smelt).
" Water supply impacts are expected to average
400 kaf/year on average, with impacts rising to
1. 1 maf/year in critical years.
" The protections include:
" Salinity standards for protection of estuarine
habitat similar to those promulgated by EPA.
* Significant reductions in Delta exports during
the critical spring period (February-June).
" Increases in San Joaquin flows and reductions
in export pumping to protect Fall-Run San
Joaquin salmon.
* Frequent closures of the Delta Cross Channel
gate to keep down-migrating salmon from
being swept into the Central Delta.
* Restrictions on the take of endangered species
(implemented through the U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Service (hereinafter "USFWS") and the National
Marine Fisheries Service (hereinafter "NMFS")
only).
* Real time operation of Delta pumps so that
pumping is reduced below the standards when
necessary to reduce environmental impacts
and increased above the Standards when high-
er pumping is safe.
" A $180 million fund designed to improve habi-
tat conditions through upstream restoration,
screening intakes, and (possibly) the purchase
of water.
The Agreement is attractive to the state and
federal governments, to the water users, and to the
environmental community for the following rea-
sons:
" The environment will get state-endorsed stan-
dards in the Estuary hopefully sufficient to sta-
bilize populations.
" The federal government will be able to step
back and let the state take a greater role in
water management.
* Urban and agricultural agencies will get much
greater predictability in water supply at a price
they can afford.
" The Agreement opens the door to adaptive
management, which offers the potential of
greater environmental protection without
increased hits on water users.
" The Agreement also opens the door to a new
long-term planning process with the potential
to provide for quantum leaps in environmental
conditions and in urban and agricultural water
supplies.
III. HISTORY OF BAY/DELTA
ENVIRONMENTAL PROCESSES
Focused efforts to achieve improvements in the
environmental conditions in the Bay-Delta Estuary
might be said to have begun in 1987 with the begin-
ning of the so-called Bay-Delta Hearings (here-
inafter "Hearings"), held under the auspices of the
SWRCB. During those Hearings, the Bay Area com-
munity presented strong scientific evidence demon-
strating the decline of the estuarine environment
and implicating both the reduction in fresh water
flow through the Estuary and the impact of massive
Delta diversions as a major cause of this decline.
The environmental community was so success-
ful in its advocacy that in 1988 the SWRCB pub-
lished a draft set of water quality standards requir-
ing major increases in spring Delta outflow and
major reductions in export pumping. The water user
community, particularly the San Joaquin and
Southern California water agencies dependant
upon Delta exports, reacted very negatively to the
draft standards, and they were quickly withdrawn.
In 1994, San Joaquin and Southern California
export water agencies were in the vanguard insist-
ing that the SWRCB adopt a set of strong and com-
prehensive standards to protect the Estuary. On
December 15, 1994, urban, agricultural, and envi-
ronmental organizations, as well as the state and
federal governments signed a dramatic agreement
that not only promised strong Bay-Delta standards,
but also $180 million over three years for habitat
restoration and modifications of water project oper-
ations on a daily basis to reduce the impacts of
pumping.
The odyssey from firestorm to consensus
resembles, in some ways, the plot line of the movie
"Groundhog Day," in which the protagonist is
doomed to repeating the same basic chain of events
until he can get it right.' In any case, the key ele-
ments in the process can be summarized as follows:
1. Tim Quinn of the Metropolitan Water District first came up
with this analogy, as best I can remember,
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The Three-Way Process
The 'Three-Way Process" began when environ-
mentalists met from 1991 through 1993 with agri-
cultural and urban representatives in an effort to
reach agreement on a program to meet the needs of
each interest. The talks did not lead to specific
actions, but they did lay the conceptual foundations
for the 1994 Agreement. In essence, during these
three-way talks, most water users came to accept
that the environmental problems in the Estuary
were so severe that productive discussion on such
issues as water development and Delta transfer
would never occur until environmental conditions
were stabilized. For this reason, the Three-Way
Process developed a proposal for (1) immediate
environmental improvements in the Estuary, linked
to (2) a long-term planning process designed to
improve conditions for water users and the environ-
ment. (hereinafter the 'Three-Way Formula") The
linkage of immediate environmental benefits with
long-term planning was the foundation for the
Governor's water policy in 1992 and for a state-fed-
eral framework agreement in 1994.
The Governor's Policy
Governor Wilson published a water policy in
1992 which echoed the Three-Way Formula with the
significant difference that he would be the "honest
broker" for the agreement (substituting himself for
elaborate safeguards to assure fairness written into
the Three-Way Formula). Accordingly, the SWRCB
began work on draft decision (hereinafter "D 1630")
for immediate environmental improvement while
the Bay Delta Oversight Council (hereinafter
"BDOC"), made up of urban, agricultural, and envi-
ronmental representatives, began a long-term plan-
ning process for the Estuary. The attempt almost
succeeded. Both the urban and environmental com-
munities gave guarded support to D 1630, and all
sides supported the BDOC process. Nevertheless,
on April 1, 1993, Governor Wilson asked the SWRCB
to withdraw D 1630.
The reasons for the Governor's decision were
two-fold. First, the agricultural agencies dependant
upon export water-primarily Kern County Water
Agency-had decided that they did not wish to
exchange the certainty of supply losses represented
by D 1630 for the possibility of supply improve-
ments promised by the BDOC process. Second, the
federal government was intervening in California
water management under the ESA on behalf of both
the winter run salmon and Delta smelt. Since the
ESA protections were arguably more stringent than
D 1630, Governor Wilson could, by withdrawing D
1630, place the blame for improved standards on
the federal government.
What the Governor did not count on was that
the environmental community would withdraw en
masse from the BDOC process, thereby effectively
eviscerating the second half of the Governor's poli-
cy. Moreover, by withdrawing from the field, the
Governor had left the federal government to control
the Delta using the harsh rules of the ESA.
Endangered Species Act
NMFS listed the winter run salmon as a threat-
ened species in 1989. In 1992, the USFWS listed the
Delta smelt as an endangered species. As a result of
these ESA listings,,NMFS and USFWS have imposed
strict conditions on the operations of the state and
federal water projects. Of particular concern were
numerical limits on the number of Delta smelt and
winter run salmon which could be taken at the
pumps. Such take limits were objectionable to
water users, not just because they had water costs.
but because they decreased the reliability of supply
and made planning difficult.2
The ESA Bay/Delta standards had two tremen-
dously beneficial effects. First, they were the only
regulatory mechanism able to protect the endan-
gered species of the Estuary (and other species,
because of overlaps) during the latter part of the
1987-92 drought. Secondly, by imposing painful
water costs and unreliability on export agencies, the
ESA made it much easier for export agencies to
accept state-adopted standards; after the ESA, even
strong environmental standards started looking
good, provided that the reliability of supply could
be improved.
2. Inter-annual supply planning has always been difficult in
California. Precipitation in one year is simply is not well-correlated
with precipitation in the previous year. California has developed
enormous amounts of storage to carry water over from year to year
to ameliorate this uncertainty.
By contrast, relatively sophisticated intra-annual supply plan-
ning is possible, because annual runoff levels are predictable with
fair accuracy by March or April of each year. whether reservoirs are
empty or full is known by this time- The predictability of supplies
intra-annually is important, because it allows water users to make
more efficient management decisions. Growers can predict how
much acreage they can farm. Districts can decide whether to call for
shortages or to seek temporary sources of supply Based upon sta-
tistical analyses, distrcts can determine whether they should seek
nev permanent sources of supply
Take limits threatened the intra-annual predictability of water
supply for exporters, becuse the taking of fish at the export pumps
Is not well correlated with precipitation. since when the fish show
up at the pumps is difficult to predict Thus. even with a wet winter
and full storage, exports might be tow beause of limits on takes. It
Is dear that water agencies consider the loss of intra-annual and
ihter-annual predictability caused by take limits to be more dam-
aging to them than the mere loss of water or the expenditure of
cash to protect the environment
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Federal Legislation
In 1992, Congress passed, and President Bush
signed, the Central Valley Project Improvement Act
(hereinafter "CVPIA"). Among other things, the
CVPIA dedicated some 800,000 acre-feet of water
per year from the Central Valley Project (hereinafter
"CVP") and created a $50 million per year fund for
environmental enhancement. As with the ESA, the
CVPIA both provided protection on the ground and,
by imposing stringent standards, made it easier for
the federal water contractors to support state-
adopted Delta standards.
Environmental Protection Agency Standards
The Environmental Protection Agency (here-
inafter "EPA') is required, under the CWA to
approve state water quality control plans. If the
states do not adequately protect water quality, the
EPA is required to step in and promulgate its own
standards. When California withdrew D 1630, the
EPA decided that it could no longer wait for the
state to act, and it began its own promulgation
process. The EPA standard-setting was perhaps less
crucial than the ESA or the CVPIA in bringing water
users to the negotiating table, since they were skep-
tical that the EPA could implement its new stan-
dards. However, the EPA process was a catalyst for
a great deal of negotiation between the urban and
environmental communities over standards which
would protect the environment with the least possi-
ble impact on water users. Moreover, the EPA stan-
dards were, in fact, implemented as ESA standards
by the USFWS and NMFS.
The State-Federal Framework Agreement
Almost immediately, the Wilson administration
came to regret its decision to abandon the field. The
press widely-criticized the Governor's decision to
abandon state standards. In practical terms, it left
the state with no justification for easing the federal
government out of water management. On the con-
trary, it strengthened the federal justification for
intervention. Additionally, the federal actions under
ESA to protect winter run salmon and Delta smelt
were considered unnecessarily stringent by the
water users. After prodding by the urban and busi-
ness communities, the state essentially reversed
course and negotiated a framework agreement with
the federal government (hereinafter "Framework
Agreement"). The Framework Agreement was, yet
again, a restatement of the Three-Way Formula:
immediate Bay/Delta improvements linked to a
long-term planning process. In this case, the state
of California would generate, through the SWRCB,
standards comparable to the federal EPA and ESA
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standards. Once these standards were in place and
implemented, the federal government would
release primary control of the Delta to the state. At
the same time, a new long-term planning process
would take place, this time under joint state-feder-
al auspices.
IV. BIOLOGY AND REMEDIATION
The Estuary has been subjected to a wide vari-
ety of injuries over the last century, including:
Land use changes
Throughout the Central Valley and in the Delta,
tidal and seasonal wetlands were drained and
diked. Rivers were forced into narrow channels. In
the Delta, this phenomenon resulted in "islands"
surrounded by narrow Delta channels. The result of
these changes was a massive loss of fish, bird, and
plant habitat.
Destruction of spawning habitat
Dams constructed on most Central Valley
streams and rivers destroyed much of the habitat for
Chinook salmon. Salmon spawning is now generally
restricted to short stretches of river below dams on
the valley floor. Spawning within these restricted
areas can be harmed by improper temperatures, fluc-
tuations in outflows, and toxic releases.
Reduced outflows
A significant portion of the water that once
flowed through the Central Valley watershed is now
diverted, either upstream or from the Delta, for
urban and agricultural use. Because the spring
months are characterized by high flows (from
snowmelt) with little fear of flooding, diversions of
flows are particularly high during this period.
Unfortunately, the spring is also a key period for
many Delta species. Statistical analysis indicates
convincingly that higher Delta outflows in the
spring are correlated with the health of many Delta
species.
Diversions
The diversion of water harms the ecosystem,
not just by reducing flows, but also by physically
drawing fish into the pumps (or into the vicinity of
the pumps, where predators await them). The state
and federal pumps in the southern Delta are the two
most notorious examples. However, thousands of
additional diversion points exist within the Delta
islands and along the Central Valley tributaries, The
amount of harm caused by diversions is difficult to
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quantify, since much of the damage is caused in the
vicinity of the pumps and not in the pumps them-
selves. The impact, however, is certainly large.
- Because of the problems outlined above.
numerous species and populations dependant
upon the Estuary and the Central Valley watershed
are on the verge of extinction. These species include
the winter and spring run Chinook salmon, Delta
smelt, Longfin smelt, and Sacramento splittail. The
threat of extinction has become so great that near-
ly everyone now agrees that something must be
done to remedy retrieve the situation.
The protection and restoration of the Estuary
requires remedial measures to undo the impacts of
past environmental insults. Categorizing these
remedial measures in terms of possible short-term,
medium-range, and long-term goals generates the
following rough list:
Measures that can be taken immediately.
* Control Delta inflow and outflow through oper-
ation of the state and federal projects.
Increased Delta outflow is particularly needed
during the spring months.
* Control'the operation of gates within the Delta.
* Close gates (at the Delta Cross Channel in the
north Delta and the Old River Barrier in the
South Delta). in order to help keep salmon
migrating down the Sacramento and San
Joaquin Rivers away from the Central Delta and
away from the export pumps.
" Control diversions at the export facilities by
limiting exports at times when the diversion of
water causes biological damage. The most
important period for the reduction of pumping
in order to minimize biological damage
appears to be in the spring.
Measures that can be taken within a few years.
" Control Delta inflow and outflow by regulating
the operation of all Central Valley water users
(and thus, control inflow by tributary). This
measure requires a water rights decision by the
SWRCB or an environmental purchase mecha-
nism.
" Limit impact of Delta island and tributary diver-
sions through screening of intakes or changing
of diversion patterns.
" Develop an adaptive management system in
which diversions (and outflows) are attuned to
biological conditions in real-time.
• Reduce toxic discharges.
Measures that may take a decade or more.
" Major new plumbing in the Delta or in the
Central Valley (e.g., replacement of the Delta
export pumps with an isolated transfer system).
* Development of an integrated groundwater
management system in the Central Valley.
" Major additions to storage (including surface
and groundwater storage facilities).
" Restoration of large areas of the Delta to ripar-
ian. wetland. and shallow tidal habitat.
This topology and the severity of the remedial
measures explain the strategy which was developed
in the Three-Way Process and which is being played
out with the December Agreement and the long-
term planning process. The first step is to imple-
ment those measures which can be taken immedi-
ately to stabilize the environment of the Estuary
(the short- and middle-term measures). Then, using
the breathing space created by the implementation
of the initial measures, consideration can be given
to longer-term actions.
V. STRATEGIES, TACTICS, AND POLITICS
The process by which the Agreement came to
together was convoluted. All sides were tempted to
walk away from the negotiations. In fact, this nearly
happened. In the end. however, the desirability of
the Agreement from all perspectives provided the
impetus to keep everyone at the negotiating table.
Before describing how the Agreement coalesced, it
is useful to discuss the motivations of each of the
key players.
The State
The state administration was very ambivalent
toward the negotiations and implementation of the
State-Federal Framework Agreement. The
Framework Agreement was good policy, but the pol-
itics were dicey. In addition to the same considera-
tions which led Governor Wilson to withdraw D
1630, other concerns surfaced:
* By engineering a collapse of joint state-federal
protection and management in the Estuary and
forcing the federal government to take full
responsibility for protecting the Estuary,
Governor Wilson could blame the feds for any
economic repercussions and argue that he was
defending the states rights against imperial
Washington.
* Any agreement by California in 1994 to imple-
ment standards under the direction of the fed-
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eral government would be seen as a turnaround
from 1993, when Governor Wilson retracted his
own standards rather than enter into negotia-
tions with the federal government.
" A joint state-federal long-term planning
process would wipe out the state's own long-
term process and would be an admission that
the state could not plan and manage the Delta
without federal involvement.
* If export agriculture representatives, especially
those from Kern County, were not amenable to
the Agreement, then implementation of
SWRCB standards could cost the administra-
tion a major source of political support.
On the other hand, cooperation with the feder-
al government on developing SWRCB standards
and a long-term process offered several advantages,
including:
" Strong SWRCB standards could wrest primary
control over the Delta away from the federal
agencies. In particular, a proactive state posi-
tion on standards would provide leverage to get
NMFS and USFWS to ease their strict take lim-
its at the export pumps.
* The Agreement could be seen as fulfillment of
the Governor's water policy.
" Important constituencies within the urban,
business, and agricultural communities were
strongly supportive of reaching a stable agree-
ment.
In the fall of 1994, the state administration
decided to force a state-federal crisis by having the
SWRCB adopt draft standards which would be too
weak for the federal government to accept. However,
under pressure from the urban and business com-
munities and parts of the agricultural community,
the state agreed to make an effort to accommodate
the federal government, and the door was open to
reaching an agreement. Even then, state support for
the Agreement was clearly conditioned on the
acceptability of the Agreement to the Kern County
Water Agency (hereinafter "KCWA"). If the KCWA
refused to approve the Agreement, the state would
almost certainly have backed away the Agreement
(echoing the state's decision to back away from D
1630).
The Federal Government
The federal administration was strongly sup-
portive of reaching an accommodation with the
state on SWRCB standards and the long-term
process. The administration did not want to give
Governor Wilson an opportunity to use a Bay/Delta
crisis as an opportunity to bash the federal govern-
ment and the ESA. The federal government also did
not wish to remain in the business of managing the
Delta on a long-term basis. On the other hand, the
federal government was obligated to protect the
Estuary under a variety of federal laws, including
the ESA, CWA, and the CVPIA.
For these reasons, the federal government was
in a difficult position. If it took a very hard line on
standards, the state would walk away from the
negotiations. If it took a soft line, the state would
score a political victory, and the environmental
organizations would sue the federal government for
failure to comply with environmental laws.
Moreover, the federal government was not uni-
fied internally. Both NMFS and USFWS were taking
a hard line on the flows and take standards needed
to protect winter run salmon and Delta smelt. In
particular, both were committed to a standard
which would limit reverse flows and to stringent
limits on the take of these fish at the pumps, Water
user groups opposed both issues because of the
water costs (with reverse flows) and decreased reli-
ability of supply (from take limits). The federal
administration finally convinced both NMFS and
USFWS to consider alternative approaches to the
protection of endangered species, provided that
protection was not jeopardized. The willingness by
NMFS and USFWS to look at a variety of approach-
es eased the resolution of the disputes over export
pumping controls and take limits.
The Environmental Organizations
The primary environmental organizations
involved in the negotiations leading up to the
Agreement were The Bay Institute, the
Environmental Defense Fund, and the Natural
Heritage Institute.
These organizations generally accepted the
Three-Way Formula: immediate environmental
improvements with added protection and restora-
tion in the long-term planning process. For this rea-
son, environmental groups were not seeking to gain
full environmental protection from the negotia-
tions, but rather standards adequate to stabilize the
estuarine environment and assure protection of
endangered species.
This strategy was based on the assumption that
water interests could and would block any environ-
mental restoration program that caused major new
shortages in export areas. Therefore, while protec-
tion adequate to stabilize the situation in the
Estuary was necessary and possible in the short
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term, full restoration in a single step was not.
Additional improvements in the Estuary would have
to be part of a future long-term planning effort; this
effort would begin in 1995 under joint state-federal
auspices. The sooner that planning effort could
begin, the sooner the environment could expect to
achieve major additional gains in protection.
Moreover, the environmental groups were
reluctant to rely upon the federal government and
particularly upon the ESA as the primary bulwark of
protection for the Estuary. For this reason, environ-
mental groups were willing to accept somewhat less
than they might have hoped for from the ESA in
return for the assurance that all sides (especially
the state and the water users) would support the
new Standards. The wisdom of this strategy was
borne out by the November elections.
Urban Water Agencies
The urban water agencies, like the environmen-
tal organizations, believed that the Three-Way
Formula of immediate environmental protections
coupled with a long-term planning process was the
best way to achieve their goal of a high quality, reli-
able, and affordable water supply. This conclusion
was based upon the following considerations:
" Urban water agencies generally were not facing
an immediate major water supply problem.
With water conservation, reclamation, and a
major reduction in baseline demand due to the
previous drought, demand would not outstrip
supply for a decade or more. Water transfers
from agriculture provided an additional buffer.
" However, urban agencies were facing immedi-
ate water quality and security problems, and.
given current trends, would face project water
supply problems within a decade or so.
Water quality. Delta water had high amounts of
organics, which reacted with disinfectants dur-
ing treatment to form compounds which might
be carcinogenic. EPA water quality standards
for these compounds would have made treat-
ment of Delta water increasingly expensive.
Security. There was a significant probability
that a major earthquake near the Delta would
lead to the collapse of many Delta islands
simultaneously. Since the islands were below
sea level, a collapse would cause water to
rush into the islands, probably from the Bay.
The inrush would bring salty water into the
Delta, making the water undrinkable for many
months, if not longer.
Water supply. The current physical and regula-
tory arrangements in the Delta virtually cut
off southern California from additional
Sacramento Valley water supplies. In the long
run. Southern California either had to be pre-
pared to meet future demands from existing
supplies, cannibalize west side agriculture, or
get access to additional supplies from the
Sacramento Valley (whether by using adap-
tive management techniques or a safer trans-
fer facility).
" Until the Delta environment was stabilized, no
other water management initiatives involving
the Delta would be achievable. Instead, most
attention would continue to be given to the
needs of endangered species and new stan-
dards, and water supplies would be cut in
unpredictable ways. Certainly, few environmen-
talists would be willing to support long-term
planning and water management strategies
when the Estuary was continuing to collapse in
the short term.
" The water and financial cost to urban agencies
of immediate standards to protect the Estuary
were affordable. On the other hand, the costs of
not proceeding with a long-term planning
process were potentially enormous.
In essence, the urban agencies embarked upon
a 20-year strategic plan: supporting standards for
the Estuary and giving up water in the short term, in
exchange for (1) gaining middle-term stabilization
of the estuarine environment and reduction in the
risk of unforeseen shortages and (2) laying the foun-
dation for a long-term planning process that would
provide for urban needs well into the 21st century.
in many ways, the urban and environmental visions
were compatible, provided that future modes of
water acquisition were environmentally friendly.
However, accepting the urban offer of short- and
long-term environmental gains for the Estuary and
for Central Valley rivers implied that environmental-
ists had to abandon attempts to use water short-
ages to constrain urban growth. While some envi-
ronmentalists might be unwilling to give up this
leverage, the question is best left for another day.
Agriculture
Of all the interest groups, agriculture had the
greatest reservations about the Three-Way Formula:
Upstream agriculture. A state commitment to
implementing new standards to protect the
vrintu 1995
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Estuary would require water. Upstream agricul-
ture had, in the past, demanded that junior
users (e.g., the state and federal projects) bear
the full burden of protective standards. In prac-
tice, there was a significant likelihood that the
SWRCB, in its water rights process, would
attempt to reallocate some water from upstream
users relying on the public trust doctrine and
other authorities. Therefore, since upstream
agriculture was generally water rich, it arguably
had fewer gains and greater risks from state
implementation of short-term standards and a
long-term planning process.
Nevertheless, the position of upstream agri-
culture was ambiguous. The Northern California
Water Association signed the Agreement 15 on
behalf of a number of agricultural districts (pri-
marily rice-growing) in the Sacramento Valley.
However, other upstream agricultural districts
were conspicuous in their absence from the sign-
ing of the Agreement. Despite any ambiguities,
upstream agriculture would most probably not
oppose the SWRCB Standards; of course, this
could all change when the SWRCB determines
who should give up water to meet the standards.
Export agriculture. Export agriculture had histori-
cally opposed new standards for the Estuary
because, even if upstream agriculture con-
tributed some water, export agriculture would
continue to bear a major part of the burden.
Unlike the urban agencies, export agriculture was
already suffering from water shortages.
Contributions to Delta protection meant that
land would have to be fallowed and/or ground-
water tables would have to drop. Some farmers
might go bankrupt. Therefore, the sacrifices
involved in accepting Delta Standards had
greater immediate consequences to export agri-
culture than to urban exporters. The fear of losing
water led the KCWA to oppose D 1630 in 1993. On
the other hand, export agriculture was subject to
the same dynamics as the urban export agencies:
without a settlement in the Delta, water supply
conditions would only get worse. For this reason,
export agriculture was internally divided on the
advisability of supporting Delta standards.
Hardliners, intent on resisting the implementa-
tion of new standards, held the upper hand.
Recently, the burden of complying with the strin-
gent ESA and CVPIA requirements gave the mod-
erate faction grudging support for standards with
the argument that new standards would improve,
not worsen water supply conditions.
VI. THE DEAL IS CUT
The EPA was required under court order to
issue its final Standards for the Estuary on
December 15, 1994. Both the NMFS and USFWS
also determined that they would issue their biolog-
ical opinions for winter run salmon and Delta smelt
on the same date. The biological opinions repre-
sented de facto Delta standards because they set
flow, export, and take limits for the state and feder-
al projects. Water users had been very unhappy with
the biological opinions of 1993 and 1994, because
they felt that the loss of water and reliability were
unreasonably high. In any case, the federal govern-
ment was ready to propose and implement a set of
strong Bay/Delta standards for 1995.
Under the Framework Agreement, the SWRCB
was obligated to issue draft Bay/Delta Standards by
December, 1994, and to promulgate final standards
by early 1995. If the Standards were adequate to sat-
isfy federal mandates, then the federal government
would step back and let California resume active
control over Delta management. If the standards
were too weak, however, the federal government
would refuse to accede to the Standards and con-
tinue its operation of the Delta. Thus, the stage was
set for either consensus or conflict between the
state and federal governments.
As discussed above, the federal, urban, and
environmental players all had reasons to avoid a
breakdown in negotiations between the state and
federal governments. Thus, in early 1994, urban and
environmental interests, in cooperation with the
EPA, nearly agreed on the measures needed to
implement the EPA standards. This agreement
would serve as one of the foundations of the
Bay/Delta Agreement.
Urban interests, calculating that the state
administration would not support state standards
equivalent to the federal standards without
approval from export agriculture, abandoned their
bilateral discussions with the environmental com-
munity and opened a dialogue with the agricultural
community on the possibility of comprehensive
Bay/Delta standards. The urban and agricultural
groups together spent close to $1 million develop-
ing biologically-based standards which would have
minimum impact on water users.
The joint urban/agriculture proposal (here-
inafter "Urban/Ag Proposal") is described in detail
in other documents. In essence, the Urban/Ag
Proposal would have provided for:
* Spring Delta outflows somewhat lower than
outflows in the EPA standards.
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* Exports less than 30% of inflows to the Delta
from February to June, 35% in July, and 65% for
the rest of the year.
* Permanent closure of the Delta Cross Channel
gates from Febuary through May (to protect
winter run salmon), with 30 days of closure
from November through January.
* Spring pulse flows in April and May on the San
Joaquin River, coupled with closure of the Old
River Barrier, and a requirement that export
pumping could never be greater than the pulse
flow to protect fall run salmon.
a The standards assumed that the federal agen-
cies would eliminate their take requirements.
The original joint urban/agriculture/state (here-
inafter "Urb/Ag/State") plan was to present a set of
standards for adoption by the SWRCB that were rel-
atively strong, but not as strong as the federal
requirements. The Governor and the federal govern-
ment representatives would then be placed in a bat-
tle of wills, "staring down" the other to see who
blinked first. During this period, the Urb/Ag/State
group refused to discuss any modification of their
proposal with the federal government or the envi-
ronmental community. However, the Urb/Ag/State
group then inexplicably decided to make a good-
faith effort to resolve its differences of opinion with
the federal/environmental side. The change in tac-
tics was probably due to pressure from the urban
agencies and the business community, as well as
signals from the federal agencies and the environ-
mental community that they were willing to be flex-
ible on the form of the standards.
At a meeting in Monterey on December 1, the
state and federal governments continued their
stalemate, with the federal government promising
to move ahead with the ESA standards on
December 15th unless agreement was reached and
the Urb/Ag/State group predicting that such a move
would cause all efforts toward accommodation to
collapse. However, at the same meeting, it became
clear to all sides that the scientific justification for
export controls, whether based upon reverse flows
or percentage of Delta inflow, was very weak and
that accommodations might be possible which cost
less water while maintaining equivalent levels of
protection. The Urb/Ag/State group further conced-
ed by committing funds for non-water-related habi-
tat improvements, such as screening of diversions.
Despite the apparent stalemate, it became clear
that all sides wanted to reach an agreement.
On December 6th, key representatives from state
and federal agencies, and the urban, agricultural,
and environmental groups met in Los Angeles. At
that meeting, the federal agencies agreed to use the
Urd/Ag/State proposal as the basis for further discus-
sions. While consideration was given to allowing
negotiations to continue after the December 15th
deadline as long as progress was being made, most
representatives felt that the chances of reaching a
successful conclusion would be greatly reduced, if
the discussions were not fruitful by the deadline.
Also, the state pushed strongly for delay of the fed-
eral decision on whether to list the Sacramento split-
tail as threatened or endangered. The listing would
not have cost any more water, but it would have
undermined the state's argument that it had tri-
umphed over the federal government on the ESA.
The USFWS acceded to this request and delayed its
listing decision for six months.
Starting on December 12, 1995, all the repre-
sentatives met in Sacramento for three days of
marathon negotiations. While the KCA (and.
therefore, the state) nearly withdrew from the nego-
tiations on December 13th, the parties finalized a
package that modified the Urb/Ag/State proposal in
the following ways (ignoring minor changes):
" The amount of allowable exports in February
was significantly reduced. In return, the amount
of allowable exports from March through July
was raised slightly.
" Flows in the San Joaquin River in April and May
were significantly increased.
* The number of days of closure of the Delta
Cross Channel were increased.
" The water cost of the Standards were increased
slightly, from about 1.0 MAF in critical years to
less than 1.1 MAF in critical years.
" Greater flexibility was built into the Standards.
allowing exporters to make up for water lost as
a result of reduced pumping due to limit con-
cerns (if consistent with environmental protec-
tion).
" The state and federal governments and the
water users agreed to provide $180 million in
funds over three years for non-water-related
environmental improvements.
VII. UNDERSTANDING THE STANDARDS:
THEORIES OF WATER ANAGEIENT
IN THE DELTA
As discussed above in section IV on Biology
and Remediation. any standards aimed at quick
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improvements in environmental conditions in the
Estuary must be primarily based upon:
" Control over flows into and out of the Estuary.
* Diversions from the Estuary.
* The movement of water within the Estuary.
" Other fast-track projects which do not involve
the movement of water, such as screening of
diversions or control of poaching.
Delta Outflow Standards are Well-Developed
The goal is to provide optimum conditions for
the ecosystem at an acceptable cost to water users.
In some areas, correlations between physical condi-
tions and biological health serve as guides. In par-
ticular, there is strong scientific evidence to indicate
that strong Delta outflow in the spring is correlated
with biological health. The spring outflow (or salin-
ity) standard is widely supported and is part of the
package of Standards.
Competing Theories of Control Over Exports
There is very little information on which to set
the standards for the export pumps. Instead, stan-
dards are set according to conceptual models of
how movement of water in the Delta affects biology.
However, there are two competing theories forming
the basis for these conceptual models: one theory
holds that the net flows of water are biologically
dominant, while the other contends that the tidal
effects are dominant. The standards which emerge
from each theory are quite different:
Net Flows. The net flow theory follows the average
flow of water in the Delta and assumes that
biota are carried with that net flow. In this con-
ceptual model, the Delta can be thought of as a
set of pipes. If there is a net flow through the
pipes toward the export pumps, then fish and
salt will tend to be swept into the pumps over a
period of time. Under this theory, fish can be
isolated from the effects of the pumps (and the
pumps from salt) by assuring that net flows
toward the pumps are minimal when species of
concern are in the Delta. Adherents of this
school would advocate limits on reverse flows
and strict pumping limits when salmon are
migrating through the Delta. This model has
been the accepted model for several decades,
and it has major implications for policy. Under
this model, export pumping from the south
Delta must be severely constrained to protect
the Delta, and it is, therefore, intuitively attrac-
tive to environmentalists. However, since the
net flow problem can be solved by connecting
the export intakes to an isolated transfer sys-
tem around the Delta, this model has also
served as the foundation for arguments in favor
of a peripheral canal.
This theory also implies that frequent
choices must be made between closing the
Delta Cross Channel to keep salmon in the
Sacramento River (and out of the Central
Delta) and opening the Delta Cross Channel to
avoid the effect of reverse flows on Delta smelt.
In other words, gate closures may help salmon
by keeping them in the Sacramento River, but
may hurt Delta smelt by creating reverse flows
which sweep them to the pumps.
Tidal Action. In the Delta, flows due to tidal action
are perhaps 100 times greater than tidal flows
on average. Supporters of the tidal action theo-
ry analogize the mixing action induced by the
tides in the Delta to a swirling bowl of soup;
within this analogy, the export pumps are like
straws stuck into the soup. Under this theory,
fish reaching the tidal zone are not necessarily
swept into the pumps (a basic assumption of
the net flow theory), but are just as likely to be
swept away from the pumps. The most impor-
tant factors to consider under the tidal action
theory are the concentration of fish in the vicin-
ity of the intakes and the rate of pumping-in
other words, how thick is the soup and how
intense is the suction through the straw.
Therefore, net flows (e.g., reverse flows) into
the pumps are not very important per se for
either biological protection or for salinity con-
trol. Since reverse flows are irrelevant to the
movement of fish in the Delta under this theo-
ry, closure of the Delta Cross Channel is not
considered to cause a problem for Delta smelt.
The tidal action theory, therefore, tends to be
less restrictive on pumping.
There is very little evidence to show which the-
ory is correct. The tidal action theory may be accu-
rate short-time scales, while the net flow theory
may apply to longer-time scales. Another complica-
tion is the behavior of fish; many fish do not simply
float with the currents, but instead move according
to their own logic (whether toward a desired salini-
ty level or out to the ocean). In any case, no gener-
ally accepted export standard currently exists to
accurately pinpoint when it is safe to operate the
pumps.
Both theories are imbedded in the Standards in
ways that are not entirely consistent, The tidal
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action theory is the basis for the primary export
standard. The overall limit on exports is calculated
(ignoring some complications) by adding up the
total amount of Delta inflow and multiplying by a
fraction (.35 from February to June, .65 for other
months). Except for a 30-day period in April and
May (when exports cannot exceed San Joaquin
inflows), there is no consideration given to the
Delta inflow origins.
On the other hand, the Standards provide for
closing the Delta Cross Channel gates for only 45
days during the period from November through
January, because of concerns that longer closures
would create reverse flows harmful to Delta smelt.
Ironically, the application of the net flow theory in
this case by USFWS greatly reduces the protection
for spring run salmon smolts as they migrate down
through the Delta in November, December, and
January.
Non-Water Factors in Environmental Protection
Water users correctly argue that reduced flows
and increased exports are not the only cause of
environmental problems within the Estuary.
Accordingly, they complain that increased flows and
reduced diversions should not be the only tools
used to protect the Delta. In the past, environmen-
talists were suspicious of such claims, not neces-
sarily because they were wrong, but because they
were generally presented as reasons for not setting
stronger water quality standards. However, this con-
flict seems to have abated.
While water users continue to place great
emphasis on environmental protection through
non-water-related means, they now concede that
such measures should be implemented in addition to
improved flow and diversion standards. Therefore,
the Agreement includes a provision for $180 million
for measures such as: screening diversions, waste
discharge control, reduction of illegal fishing, and
riparian, wetland, and estuarine habitat restoration.
Water users benefit from this provision in two
ways: (1) the money increases the likelihood that
the new Standards will actually stabilize the
Bay/Delta environment; and (2) successful non-
water-related programs 'would demonstrate that
water-related measures could be replaced, thereby
reducing pressure for additional flow standards in
the future.
3. Delta smelt seek salinities slightly above 2 ppt Therefore.
if this line were moved into the Delta. the smelt would also move
VIII. THE STANDARDS
This section describes key elements of the
Standards in greater detail.
The Agreement attempts to develop an ecosys-
tem approach to environmental protection in the
Estuary using tools readily available over the next
three years (flows, diversions, gates, and simple
non-water measures). The ecosystem approach was
formulated by the conflict between the legal and
ecological desire to protect endangered species and
the need to keep water supply losses within politi-
cally-acceptable levels.
Estuarine Habitat Standard
This Standard can be thought of as either a
Delta outflow standard or a Delta salinity standard.
The Standard requires (roughly speaking) that salin-
ity (and outflow) conditions from February through
June be maintained at levels that would have exist-
ed in Suisun Bay. given water operations in about
1970. In other words, the Standard forces the water
projects to go back to 1970 levels and let out more
water in the late winter and spring.
The Standard is based upon mathematical cor-
relations between the average location of 2 parts
per thousand (ppt) salinity and biological indices
for species such as longfin smelt, striped bass. and
neomysis mercedes. Basically, the correlations indi-
cate that fish fare better if the average salinity is
pushed farther downstream in the spring. Salinity
conditions improve looking back in time, because
reductions in spring outflows have been continuous
over the last 50 years. Under the Standard, the
greater the runoff of water in the Central Valley
watershed from January through May the more days
the position of the 2 ppt salinity line must be down-
stream of two measuring stations in Suisun Bay
from February through June. Additionally, the 2 ppt
salinity line must be below the confluence of the
San Joaquin and Sacramento Rivers for the entire
February-June period to protect Delta smelt.3
Mathematical correlations aside, Suisun Bay
was chosen as the area for maintenance of salinity
conditions, because it contains the last prime fish
habitat left in the Estuary. Most other habitat was
diked up and converted to farming many years ago.
The Standard generally follows the EPA salinity
requirements for estuarine habitat. Environmental
groups and urban water agencies came to agree-
ment on this Standard early in 1994. It has a strong
scientific basis, provides significant environmental
protection, and has water supply impacts which
upstream--and into vicinity of the export pumps
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were acceptable to urban and, eventually, agricul-
tural groups. However, because the Standard is tied
to actual runoff conditions, both sides share the
benefits and risks of wet and dry years.
Delta Export/Inflow Relationships
This is the primary Standard to control pump-
ing by the state and federal export facilities in the
south Delta. Basically, exporters are allowed to
pump no more than a given percentage of inflow at
any given time. The allowable percentage varies
over the year, with a low of 35% during February to
June and a high of 65% during July to January.
There is an additional pumping limitation in
the April-May period in order to protect San
Joaquin River salmon (see below). Also, pumping is
reduced, if necessary, to minimize the risk of danger
to endangered species (see below). Otherwise,
pumping is controlled by this Standard alone;
absolute pumping limits and reverse flow standards
have been superseded.
The basis for the export/inflow Standard is pri-
marily intuitive. It seems logical that, if more water
is flowing into the Delta, then pumping can be
increased without causing additional impacts on
the environment. Similarly, if inflow drops, then
exports should also be curtailed. The controversy
surrounding this logic is that the source of Delta
inflow is not considered. For example, if
Sacramento River inflow is high, but San Joaquin
River inflow is low, then the level of pumping
allowed under the Standard may actually be higher
than what the San Joaquin River can sustain; con-
ceivably, water from the Sacramento River will make
its way across the Delta to the pumps, thereby
adversely impacting the environment. The impor-
tance of this phenomenon depends upon whether
the net flow theory or the tidal action theory is in
fact the dominant physical mechanism governing
the movement of biota in the Delta; this issue is dis-
cussed in greater detail in section VII, above.
The Standard will significantly reduce export
pumping in the later winter and spring months com-
pared to historical levels, which is something envi-
ronmental groups have sought for many years
because of this period's importance to the lifecycles
of many species. On the other hand, the Standard
will force greater pumping in the summer and fall
months, and this may cause new problems to appear.
Overall, however, the shift in pumping patterns away
from the spring offers significant net benefits.
San Joaquin Fall Run Salmon Standards
Salmon smolts migrate down from the
Stanislaus, Tuolumne, and Merced Rivers, into the
San Joaquin River, into the Delta, and, eventually, out
into the ocean during March, April, and May. It is very
tricky getting these salmon past the pumps, which
are located just west of the San Joaquin River. There
are at least three different options: (1) reduce pump-
ing; (2) wall off the San Joaquin River from the pumps
by putting a barrier at "Old River," where a channel
leading directly into the pumps splits off from the
main San Joaquin River; or (3) increase flows in the
San Joaquin River in order to transport the salmon
away from the pumps as quickly as possible.
However, placing a barrier at Old River (the sin-
gle most protective solution) causes more water to
be sucked from the south Delta toward the pumps,
which, in turn, might cause increased entrainment
of Delta smelt. To solve this problem, export levels
should be reduced during this critical three-month
period, but these reductions would be unacceptable
to water exporters.
Given the tradeoff between protection of
salmon and protection of Delta smelt and the polit-
ical/economic need to maintain significant exports
during this three-month period, a Standard was
developed which focused most protection efforts on
a limited period during which a majority of the
salmon would be migrating. Therefore, base flows
of 700-3,400 cfs, depending on year-type, will be
provided in the San Joaquin River from February
through May of all years. However, primary protec-
tion efforts will occur over a 30-day period (not nec-
essarily continuous) in April and May. During this
"window of protection," pulses of water, varying
from about 3,000-8,000 cfs, depending upon year-
type, will be released down the three San Joaquin
River tributaries to stimulate migration down-
stream. At the same time, a barrier will be placed at
Old River and export pumping will be restricted to
100% of Vernalis San Joaquin inflow.
The compromise reflected in the Standard is
not ideal from the standpoint of environmental pro-
tection. Significant numbers of salmon will migrate
outside the window of protection and will suffer
heavy losses. Even during the 30-day period, when
the flow levels are good, exports will remain at dan-
gerously high levels (though they will be reduced
compared to past conditions). Also, compliance
with the Standard will only be possible to the extent
that the federal government can release water from
New Melones, at least until the SWRCB water rights
decision is promulgated; essentially, the full flow
amounts may not be available for the first three
years or so. For all its deficiencies, the Standard is a
significant step forward from past conditions.
Bolstering this Standard through the purchase
of additional water and export rights and through
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the flexibility in the Agreement to reduce pumping
below nominal standards will be a high priority over
the next few years.
Operational Flexibility and Adaptive Management
The Delta is a major ecological resource, which
also serves as a major switching yard for some 6-7
MAF of pumped water/year. The incongruence of
these two uses has been one of the primary causes
of conflict over the Delta.
It is not possible to accurately predict when the
pumps actually cause environmental damage.
Therefore, whenever preset export standards are
used, the restrictions exports must be very stringent
in order to assure that protection will be achieved.
Fixed standards strict enough to provide for signifi-
cant restoration of the Estuary (i.e., to provide pro-
tection significantly beyond the current Agreement)
would require that exports from the south Delta be
reduced well below the export levels agreed to in
the Bay/Delta Agreement.
Therefore, to achieve optimal environmental
restoration, there are three available alternatives:
reducing export levels, moving the pumps out of the
Delta (e.g., implementing an isolated transfer sys-
tem), or finding ways to allow levels of exports near
current levels but with reduced environmental
impacts. As to this last option, the most promising
method is adaptive management, in which pumping
is tied to the actual physical and biological condi-
tions existing at any given time. For example, if
large numbers of Delta smelt move into the vicinity
of the pumps, then pumping could be suppressed
before takes become a problem. During other times,
if there are few fish in the vicinity of the pumps,
then pumping could be increased. Such a manage-
ment approach offers the possibility of highly effi-
cient and highly protective biological standards,
while also allowing for significant restoration of the
Estuary without the need for dramatic reductions in
exports or an isolated transfer facility (or its equiv-
alent).
Adaptive management was introduced into the
Agreement in order to assure water exporters that,
if exports were reduced below nominal export stan-
dards to reduce the take of endangered species,
pumping above the Standards would be allowed
later in the year to compensate (provided that
increased pumping was consistent with biological
protection). In this way, endangered species could
get adequate protection without dramatic reduc-
tions in the predictability of export supply (one of
the key issues which exporters had with the ESA).
However, another section of the Agreement
implies that reductions in pumping and subsequent
increases can also be made at the request of an
'Operations Group.: This clause allows adaptive
management to go beyond take limits. The
Operations Group will be comprised of representa-
tives from the key state and federal water manage-
ment and wildlife protection agencies, as well as
water user, environmental, and fisheries interests.
In essence, exporters will have a water budget each
year (the amount of water they could export given
the nominal export standards), and, within that
budget, water managers will be able to modify
export controls to maximize environmental returns.
A major flaw in the concept of adaptive man-
agement is that it will not provide the promised ben-
efits unless accurate predictions can be made as to
when it is safe to operate the pumps. There are three
critical elements to making adaptive management
work. (1) developing a better understanding of the
biological relationships that control how species
respond to other species and to physical conditions,
(2) monitoring fish populations to determine the
locations of key species in the Delta at any given
time to ptedict their future locations, and (3) devel-
oping institutions which insure that water is truly
managed to maximize environmental benefits.
Although there is much work ahead, progress is
being made on all three of these elements. In par-
ticular, a monitoring provision in the Agreement
will help develop information for the first two ele-
ments. Also, the Operations Group formed by the
Agreement provides a basis for an institutional
structure to manage exports in the future.
Adaptive management will greatly benefit the
environment and will dominate Delta water man-
agement within a decade. It can also be a frighten-
ing concept, because it is based on the assumption
that institutions will make sound environmental
decisions extemporaneously. Strictly-dravn stan-
dards will no longer form the basis of water man-
agement, but these standards were extremely ineffi-
cient from an environmental perspective, because
they reduced the amount of environmental protec-
tion to unacceptable levels in favor of political and
economic justifications.
Monitoring
A key element of the Agreement is stepped
monitoring programs to determine how well the
Standards are working, locate fish concentrations to
allow adaptive management, and help to develop
new and improved standards in the future.
Category 3 Funding
The use of the $180 million fund for non-water-
related environmental protection was discussed
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above in section VII. A small portion of this money
may also be used for additional flows to bolster
weaknesses in the Agreement.
Endangered Species
The two Delta species listed under the ESA-
winter run salmon and Delta smelt-receive rela-
tively strong protection in this Agreement. The
Standards reflect the needs of these species and
ESA take limits remain as a bottom-line safety net.
Environmentalists are more concerned with the
species that are not currently listed, but probably
deserve to be listed-spring run salmon,
Sacramento splittail, and longfin smelt. The habitat
needs of the splittail and the longfin smelt are gen-
erally met by the Standards, even though ESA take
limits will not apply. However, the Sacramento
spring run salmon is the species most at risk from
these Standards.
As previously discussed, above, protection for
the spring run salmon gave way to the needs of
Delta smelt and water exporters. Spring run salmon
need protection as they migrate down the
Sacramento River during November, December, and
January, and this protection can be provided by
either closing the Delta Cross Channel (to keep
them out of the Central Delta) or by reducing pump-
ing during this period. However, full closure of the
Delta Cross Channel was opposed by USFWS,
because it would increase losses of Delta smelt.
Also, reductions in exports were opposed by water
exporters, because, with spring pumping greatly
reduced by the new Standards, the November-
January window was one of their main pumping
opportunities.
The Agreement does provide for Cross Channel
closures during 45 days in November-January, and
this will help, particularly if the closures can be tar-
geted when spring run salmon are likely to be pre-
sent. Other measures that can be taken to bolster
spring run salmon protection include convincing
USFWS that full closure of the Cross Channel would
not put Delta smelt at risk, spending Category 3
money on improving habitat conditions upstream,
using the flexibility in the Standards to reduce
pumping when spring run salmon are likely to be
present, and seeking a listing of spring run salmon
as an endangered species.
In the past, environmental groups have held off
seeking an ESA listing, because of its effect on the
commercial fishing industry. In fact, if the other
measures are successful, a listing might not be
needed. However, all parties are aware that an ESA
listing petition may be necessary to protect the
spring run salmon.
A new ESA listing would not be welcomed by
either the state or the federal government. The state
forcefully insisted on inserting language into the
Agreement which implied that the Standards were
so complete that new listings would only occur as a
result of "unforeseen circumstances." The federal
government agreed that it would be responsible for
any additional water costs which might occur as a
result of new listings; in this regard, the state bears
no obligation for at least three years.
IX. IMPLEMENTATION
The SWRCB is committed to implementing the
new Standards through a water rights decision,
scheduled to begin in 1995. Meanwhile, the
Standards have been incorporated into the NMFS
and USFWS biological opinions for winter run
salmon and Delta smelt.
Since the biological opinions only apply to the
state and federal projects, these projects will bear
the brunt of compliance until the SWRCB spreads
the burden through its water rights decision. This
means that the two projects have every incentive to
support rapid movement through the water rights
process.
However, since the Agreement specified that
the federal share of compliance water will come out
of the 800 kaf dedicated to the environment in the
CVPIA, during critically dry years, much of the CVPIA
environmental water could be dedicated for Delta
purposes, making it unavailable for its primary pur-
pose-doubling anadromous fish.
The Agreement is limited to three years. Several
factors could lead to its collapsing after three years,
if not sooner: if the state fails to fulfill its obliga-
tions under the Agreement, if the Standards are
ineffective, if new endangered species are listed, or
if the Category 3 fund is not provided. On the other
hand, if the process is going well, there is every like-
lihood that elements of the Agreement not covered
by SWRCB standards will be extended.
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